

# T2 - Hacking 101

Armando Bioc



September 21, 2009 – September 23, 2009



# Hacking 101:

Understanding the Top Web Application Vulnerabilities and  
How to Protect Against the Next Level of Attack

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## Agenda

- Module 1: Security Landscape
- Module 2:
  - Top Attacks Overview
  - Demo of Manual Techniques
- Module 3: Workshop Exercises
- Module 4: Demo of Automated Techniques
- Module 5: An Enterprise Vision



# Module 1: Security Landscape



## Objective

1. Understand the web application environment
2. Understand and differentiate between network and application level vulnerabilities
3. Understand where the vulnerabilities exist





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
## Eight Principles of Security Management

1. Compliance Management
2. Risk Management
3. Identity Management
4. Authorization Management
5. Accountability Management
6. Availability Management
7. Configuration Management
8. Incident Management



Security


## High Level Network Architecture





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## Security Product Landscape




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## Black Box vs. White Box: Where?




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
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


# Black Box vs. White Box: What?



# High Level Web Application Architecture Review





## Web Applications – Shared Traits

- Get input from user in different ways
  - Path, Parameters, Cookies, Headers, etc.
- Use back-end servers
  - DB, LDAP/AD Server, etc.
- Use session tokens (cookie, parameter, path...)
  - Session tokens may be persistent or not
- Hold public & private information
  - Sensitive info often past the login page

## Web Application Security: What Can Happen?

- Sensitive data leakage
  - Customer, partner or company data
- Identity Theft
  - Hacker impersonating as trusted user
- Defacement – Content Modification
  - Hurts brand, misleads customers, etc.
- Application Shutdown (Site Unavailable)
  - Lack of access can cause major losses




## Open Source & Manual Products

- Proxies
  - WebScarab
  - Fiddler
  - Paros
  - BURP
  - Spike
- HTTP Editors
  - [See above]
  - Mozilla Tamper Data
  - NetCat
- Fuzzers
  - SensePost Crowbar
  - JBroFuzz
- Database Exploit
  - Absinthe
  - SQL Power Injector
- General Exploit
  - Metasploit






## Where are the Vulnerabilities?



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## Where are the Vulnerabilities?




Network

Blackbox scanners that evaluate all network objects for patches and vulnerabilities

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
# Where are the Vulnerabilities?



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
# Where are the Vulnerabilities?



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
## Where are the Vulnerabilities?



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
## Where are the Vulnerabilities?



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## Where are the Vulnerabilities?



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## Module 2:

- Top Attacks Overview
- Demo of Manual Techniques

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## The Myth: "Our Site Is Safe"

We Have Firewalls  
in Place

We Audit It Once a  
Quarter with Pen Testers

We Use Network  
Vulnerability Scanners

We Use SSL  
Encryption


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## Security and Spending Are Unbalanced



75% of All Attacks on Information Security  
Are Directed to the Web Application Layer

2/3 of All Web Applications Are Vulnerable

Gartner


Sources: Gartner, IBM, OWASP

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## 2006 Vulnerability Statistics (31,373 sites)

Percentage of websites vulnerable by class (Top 5)




\*\* <http://www.webappsec.org/projects/statistics/>

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## What is a Web Application?



*Input and Output flow through each layer of the application*

*A break in any layer breaks the whole application*

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## Infrastructure vs. Application Security Issues

	Infrastructure Vulnerabilities	Application Specific Vulnerabilities
Cause of Defect	Insecure development or deployment of <b>3<sup>rd</sup> party SW</b>	Insecure development of <b>your own applications</b>
Location of Vulnerability	3 <sup>rd</sup> party <b>infrastructure</b> (web server, OS, etc.)	<b>Application Code</b> , often resides on Application Server
Method of Exploits	Known vulnerabilities (0-day), signature based	Probing hacks, suspicious content, information leakage
Detection	Patch Management system	App Security Scanners
	Internal/External Audits, Automated Scanners	
What to do	Update patches, use trusted 3 <sup>rd</sup> party software	Training & Scanners – across the Development Life Cycle



## WASC

- Web Application Security Consortium (WASC)

Purpose:

- To develop, adopt, and advocate standards for web application security

- Official web site: [www.webappsec.org](http://www.webappsec.org)

- Web Security Threat Classification project

[http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/v1/WASC-TC-v1\\_0.pdf](http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/v1/WASC-TC-v1_0.pdf)

Purpose:

- Clarify and organize the threats to the security of a web site
- Develop and promote industry standard terminology for these issues



# WASC – Threat Classifications

(Web Application Security Consortium) [www.webappsec.org](http://www.webappsec.org)

Application Threat	Attack Types	Example Business Impact
<b>Authentication</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brute Force</li> <li>• Insufficient Authentication</li> <li>• Weak Password Recovery Validation</li> </ul>	Attacks that target a web site's method of validating the identity of a user, service or application.
<b>Authorization</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Credential/Session Prediction</li> <li>• Insufficient Authorization</li> <li>• Insufficient Session Expiration</li> <li>• Session Fixation</li> </ul>	Attacks that target a web site's method of determining if a user, service or application has the necessary permissions to perform a requested action.
<b>Client-side Attacks</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Content Spoofing</li> <li>• Cross Site Scripting</li> </ul>	The abuse or exploitation of a web site's users (breaching trust relationships between a user and a web site).
<b>Command Execution</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Buffer Overflow</li> <li>• Format String Attack</li> <li>• LDAP Injection</li> <li>• OS Commanding</li> <li>• SQL Injection</li> <li>• SSI Injection</li> <li>• XPath Injection</li> </ul>	Attacks designed to execute remote commands on the web site by manipulating user-supplied input fields.



# WASC – Threat Classifications

(Web Application Security Consortium) [www.webappsec.org](http://www.webappsec.org)

Application Threat	Attack Types	Example Business Impact
<b>Information Disclosure</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directory Indexing</li> <li>• Information Leakage</li> <li>• Path Traversal</li> <li>• Predictable Resource Location</li> </ul>	Attacks designed to acquire system specific information about a web site. This includes software distribution, version numbers, patch levels, and also secure file locations.
<b>Logical Attacks</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Abuse of Functionality</li> <li>• Denial of Service</li> <li>• Insufficient Anti-automation</li> <li>• Insufficient Process Validation</li> </ul>	The abuse or exploitation of a web application logic flow (password recovery, account registration, auction bidding and eCommerce purchasing are examples of application logic).





# OWASP

- Open Web Application Security Project  
Purpose: Dedicated to finding and fighting the causes of insecure software.
- Official web site: [www.owasp.org](http://www.owasp.org)
- The OWASP Top Ten project  
[http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Top\\_Ten\\_Project](http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Top_Ten_Project)
- Purpose:
  - A broad consensus about what the most critical web application security flaws are
  - Raise awareness of web application security issues
- We will use the Top 10 list to cover some of the most common security issues in web applications



## The OWASP Top 10 Application Attacks

Application Threat	Negative Impact	Example Impact
Cross Site scripting	Identity Theft, Sensitive Information Leakage, ...	Hackers can impersonate legitimate users, and control their accounts.
Injection Flaws	Attacker can manipulate queries to the DB / LDAP / Other system	Hackers can access backend database information, alter it or steal it.
Malicious File Execution	Execute shell commands on server, up to full control	Site modified to transfer all interactions to the hacker.
Insecure Direct Object Reference	Attacker can access sensitive files and resources	Web application returns contents of sensitive file (instead of harmless one)
Cross-Site Request Forgery	Attacker can invoke "blind" actions on web applications, impersonating as a trusted user	Blind requests to bank account transfer money to hacker
Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling	Attackers can gain detailed system information	Malicious system reconnaissance may assist in developing further attacks
Broken Authentication & Session Management	Session tokens not guarded or invalidated properly	Hacker can "force" session token on victim; session tokens can be stolen after logout
Insecure Cryptographic Storage	Weak encryption techniques may lead to broken encryption	Confidential information (SSN, Credit Cards) can be decrypted by malicious users
Insecure Communications	Sensitive info sent unencrypted over insecure channel	Unencrypted credentials "sniffed" and used by hacker to impersonate user
Failure to Restrict URL Access	Hacker can access unauthorized resources	Hacker can forcefully browse and access a page past the login page




# 1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- What is it?
  - Malicious script echoed back into HTML returned from a trusted site, and runs under trusted context
- What are the implications?
  - Session Tokens stolen (browser security circumvented)
  - Complete page content compromised
  - Future pages in browser compromised

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## XSS Example I



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## XSS Example II

The browser's address bar shows the URL: `search.aspx?txtSearch=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>`.

The page displays a "Search Results" section with the message: "No results were found for the query:".

A JavaScript alert box is visible, displaying the message: "The page at http://www.testfire.net says: ASP.NET\_SessionId=trhgq450cp5r45r2pl1fg; amSessionId=1824418181".

The HTML code is shown at the bottom, with the injected payload highlighted in red:


```
<p>No results were found for the query:<br /><br />
<span id="_ctl0_ctl0_Content_Main_lblSearch"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script></span>
```

Logos for CONVERGENCE and ISACA (San Francisco Chapter) are visible at the bottom of the slide.

## XSS – Details

- Common in Search, Error Pages and returned forms.
  - But can be found on any type of page
- Any input may be echoed back
  - Path, Query, Post-data, Cookie, Header, etc.
- Browser technology used to aid attack
  - XMLHttpRequest (AJAX), Flash, IFrame...
- Has many variations
  - XSS in attribute, DOM Based XSS, etc.

## Cross Site Scripting – The Exploit Process



## Exploiting XSS

- If I can get you to run my JavaScript, I can...
  - Steal your cookies for the domain you're browsing
  - Track every action you do in that browser from now on
  - Redirect you to a Phishing site
  - Completely modify the content of any page you see on this domain
  - Exploit browser vulnerabilities to take over machine
  - ...
- XSS is the Top Security Risk today (most exploited)

## Sticky/Embedded XSS (XSS Worms)

- Embedding malicious script in persistent location
  - “Talkback” section
  - Forum/Newsgroup
- Boosted with Web 2.0 trend
  - Customizable content
  - More user content (communities)
- XSS Can “Infest” more pages - Worm
  - MySpace worm (Samy, October 2005)



## 2. Injection Flaws

- What is it?
  - User-supplied data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command, query or data.
- What are the implications?
  - SQL Injection – Access/modify data in DB
  - SSI Injection – Execute commands on server and access sensitive data
  - LDAP Injection – Bypass authentication
  - ...



# SQL Injection

- User input inserted into SQL Command:
  - Get product details by id:  
Select \* from products where id='\$REQUEST["id"]';
  - Hack: send param id with value ' or '1'='1
  - Resulting executed SQL:  
Select \* from products where id=" or '1'='1'
  - All products returned

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## SQL Injection Example I

http://www.testfire.net/bank/login.aspx

Sign In | Contact Us | Feedback | Search

Go

AltoroMutual

DEMO SITE ONLY

ONLINE BANKING LOGIN PERSONAL SMALL BUSINESS INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL

PERSONAL

- Deposit Product
- Checking
- Loan Products
- Cards
- Investments & Insurance
- Other Services

SMALL BUSINESS

- Deposit Products
- Lending Services
- Cards
- Insurance
- Retirement
- Other Services

INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL

- About Us
- Contact Us
- Locations
- Investor Relations
- Press Room
- Careers

Online Banking Login

Username:

Password:

Login

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## SQL Injection Example II

**AltoroMutual** Sign In | Contact Us | Feedback | Search

**An Error Has Occurred**

**Summary:**

Syntax error (missing operator) in query expression 'username = '' AND password = 'asdf'.

**Error Message:**

System.Data.OleDb.OleDbException: Syntax error (missing operator) in query expression 'username = '' AND password = 'asdf'. at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteCommandTextForSingleResult(tagDBPARAMS dbParams, Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteCommandText(Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteCommand(CommandBehavior behavior, Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteReaderInternal(CommandBehavior behavior, String method) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteReader(CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.FillInternal(DataSet dataset, DataTable[] datatables, Int32 startRecord, Int32 maxRecords, String srcTable, IDbCommand command, CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.Fill(DataSet dataSet, Int32 startRecord, Int32 maxRecords, String srcTable, IDbCommand command, CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.Fill(DataSet dataSet, String srcTable) at Altoro.Authentication.ValidateUser(String uName, String pWord) in d:\downloads\AltoroMutual\_v5\website\bank\login.aspx.cs:line 68 at Altoro.Authentication.Page\_Load(Object sender, EventArgs e) in d:\downloads\AltoroMutual\_v5\website\bank\login.aspx.cs:line 32 at System.Web.UI.CallHandler.EventArgFunctionCaller(IntPtr fp, Object o, EventArgs e) at System.Web.UI.CallEventHandlerDelegateProxy.Callback(Object sender, EventArgs e) at System.Web.UI.Control.OnLoad(EventArgs e) at System.Web.UI.Control.LoadRecursive() at System.Web.UI.Page.ProcessRequestMain(Boolean includeStagesBeforeAsyncPoint, Boolean includeStagesAfterAsyncPoint)

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## SQL Injection Example - Exploit

**AltoroMutual** Sign In | Contact Us | Feedback | Search

**Online Banking Login**

Username: or 1=1--

Password:

Login

**PERSONAL**

- Deposit Product
- Checking
- Loan Products
- Cards
- Investments & Insurance
- Other Services

**SMALL BUSINESS**

- Deposit Products
- Lending Services
- Cards
- Insurance
- Retirement
- Other Services

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
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## SQL Injection Example - Outcome



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `http://www.testfire.net/bank/main.aspx`. The page displays the AltoroMutual website interface. The user is logged in as John Smith, and the account details show a balance of 1001160140. The website footer includes a disclaimer and copyright information.

AltoroMutual

Sign Off | Contact Us | Feedback | Search

DEMO SITE ONLY

MY ACCOUNT PERSONAL SMALL BUSINESS INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL

I WANT TO ...

- View Account Summary
- View Recent Transactions
- Transfer Funds
- Search News Articles
- Customize Site Language

Hello, John Smith

Welcome to Altoro Mutual Online.

View Account Details: 1001160140 Checking GO

Congratulations!

You have been pre-approved for an Altoro Gold Visa with a credit limit of \$10000!

Click [Here](#) to apply.

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## Injection Flaws – More Info


- One SQL Injection compromises entire DB
  - Doesn't matter if it's a remote page
- Not limited to SQL Injection
  - LDAP, XPath, SSI, MX (Mail)...
  - HTML Injection (Cross Site Scripting)
  - HTTP Injection (HTTP Response Splitting)

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
## Injection Flaws (SSI Injection Example) Creating commands from input



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## The return is the private SSL key of the server



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- What is it?
  - Application tricked into executing commands or creating files on server
- What are the implications?
  - Command execution on server – complete takeover
  - Site Defacement, including XSS option



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying <http://www.testfire.net/feedback.aspx>. The page has a navigation menu with links for ONLINE BANKING LOGIN, PERSONAL, SMALL BUSINESS, and INSIDE ALTOGO MUTUAL. The PERSONAL tab is selected, and the Feedback section is active. The feedback form contains the following fields:

- To: Online
- Your Name: asdf
- Your Email Address: asdf
- Subject: asdf
- Question/Comment: asdf

A Tamper Popup window is overlaid on the feedback form, displaying a list of request headers and post parameters. The post parameters table is as follows:

Post Parameter Name	Post Parameter Value
cid	comments.txt
name	asdf
email_addr	asdf
subject	asdf
comments	asdf
submit	<Submit>



## Malicious File Execution – Example cont.

Tamper Popup

http://www.testfire.net/comment.aspx

Request Header Name	Request Header Value	Post Parameter Name	Post Parameter Value
Host	www.testfire.net	cfile	myevilfile.aspx
User-Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windov	name	asdf
Accept	text/xml,application/xml,applicat	email_addr	asdf
Accept-Language	en-us,en;q=0.5	subject	asdf
Accept-Encoding	gzip,deflate	comments	%3C%25%40+Page+Language
Accept-Charset	ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.	submit	+Submit+
Keep-Alive	300		
Connection	keep-alive		
Referer	http://www.testfire.net/feedba		
Cookie	amUserInfo=UserName=Jy6Vd		

<%@ Page Language="C#" %>  
<% Response.Write(System.IO.File.ReadAllText  
("c:/windows/system32/drivers/etc/hosts")); %>

OK Cancel

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## Malicious File Execution – Example cont.

http://www.testfire.net/myevilfile.aspx

asdf, asdf, asdf, # Copyright (c) 1993-1999 Microsoft Corp. # # This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows. # # This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each # entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should # be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host name. # The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one # space. # # Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual # lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol. # # For example: # # 102.54.94.97 rhino.acme.com # source server # 38.25.63.10 x.acme.com # x client host 127.0.0.1 localhost

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## 4. Insecure Direct Object Reference


- What is it?
  - Part or all of a resource (file, table, etc.) name controlled by user input.
- What are the implications?
  - Access to sensitive resources
  - Information Leakage, aids future hacks



## Insecure Direct Object Reference - Example



## Insecure Direct Object Reference – Example Cont.



## Insecure Direct Object Reference – Example Cont.




## 5. Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF/XSRF)

- What is it?
  - Tricking a victim into sending an unwitting (often blind) request to another site, using the user's session and/or network access.
- What are the implications?
  - Internal network compromised
  - User's web-based accounts exploited

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### XSRF Exploit Illustration



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## XSRF vs. XSS

- XSS Exploits the trust a user gives a site
  - Cookies and data access to specific domain
- XSRF Exploits the trust a site gives a user
  - User “logged in” to site or has access to site (Intranet)
- XSRF may be delivered via XSS (or Sticky XSS)
- XSS may be auto-exploited via XSRF
  - XSRF on one site exploit XSS on other – hands free



## 6. Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling

- What is it?
  - Unneeded information made available via errors or other means.
- What are the implications?
  - Sensitive data exposed
  - Web App internals and logic exposed (source code, SQL syntax, exception call stacks, etc.)
  - Information aids in further hacks



## Information Leakage - Example

AltoroMutual

Sign In | Contact Us | Feedback | Search

DEMO SITE ONLY

ONLINE BANKING LOGIN PERSONAL SMALL BUSINESS INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL

PERSONAL

- Deposit Product
- Checking
- Loan Products
- Cards
- Investments & Insurance
- Other Services

SMALL BUSINESS

- Deposit Products
- Lending Services
- Cards
- Insurance
- Refinement
- Other Services

INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL

- About Us
- Contact Us
- Locations
- Investor Relations
- Press Room
- Careers

Online Banking Login

Username:

Password:

Login

<!-- To get the latest admin login, please contact SiteOps at 415-888-6189 -->

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## Improper Error Handling - Example

AltoroMutual

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DEMO SITE ONLY

ONLINE BANKING LOGIN PERSONAL SMALL BUSINESS INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL

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- Deposit Product
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SMALL BUSINESS

- Deposit Products
- Lending Services
- Cards
- Insurance
- Refinement
- Other Services

INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL

- About Us
- Contact Us
- Locations
- Investor Relations
- Press Room
- Careers

An Error Has Occurred

Summary:

Syntax error (missing operator) in query expression 'username = '' AND password = 'asdf'.

Error Message:

System.Data.OleDb.OleDbException: Syntax error (missing operator) in query expression 'username = '' AND password = 'asdf'. at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteCommandTextForSingleResult(tagDBPARAMS dbParams, Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteCommandText(Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteCommand(CommandBehavior behavior, Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteReaderInternal(CommandBehavior behavior, String method) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteReader(CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.System.Data.IDbCommand.ExecuteReader(CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.FillInternal(DataSet dataset, DataTable[] dataTables, Int32 startRecord, Int32 maxRecords, String srcTable, IDbCommand command, CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.Fill(DataSet dataset, String srcTable) at Altoro.Authentication.ValidateUser(String userName, String pWord) in d:\downloads\AltoroMutual\_v5\website\bank\login.aspx.cs:line 68 at Altoro.Authentication.Page\_Load(Object sender, EventArgs e) in d:\downloads\AltoroMutual\_v5\website\bank\login.aspx.cs:line 32 at System.Web.Util.CalliHelper.EventArgFunctionCaller(IntPtr fp, Object o, Object t, EventArgs e) at System.Web.Util.CalliEventHandlerDelegateProxy.Callback(Object sender, EventArgs e) at System.Web.UI.Control.OnLoad(EventArgs e) at System.Web.UI.Control.LoadRecursive() at System.Web.UI.Page.ProcessRequestMain(Boolean includeStagesBeforeAsyncPoint, Boolean includeStagesAfterAsyncPoint)

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## Information Leakage – Different Username/Password Error

ONLINE BANKING LOGIN PERSONAL SMALL BUSINESS INSIDE ALTORO MUTUA

PERSONAL

- Deposit Product
- Checking
- Loan Products
- Cards
- Investments & Insurance
- Other Services

SMALL BUSINESS

- Deposit Products

### Online Banking Login

Login Failed - Invalid Password

Username:

Password:

Login

ONLINE BANKING LOGIN PERSONAL SMALL BUSINESS INSIDE ALTORO MUTUA

PERSONAL

- Deposit Product
- Checking
- Loan Products
- Cards
- Investments & Insurance
- Other Services

SMALL BUSINESS

- Deposit Products

### Online Banking Login

Login Failed - Invalid Username

Username:

Password:

Login



## 7. Broken Authentication and Session Management

- What is it?
  - Session tokens aren't guarded and invalidated properly
- What are the implications?
  - Session tokens can be planted by hacker in XSS/XSRF attack, hence leaked
  - Session tokens more easily available (valid longer, less protection) to be stolen in different ways



## Broken Authentication and Session Management - Examples

- Unprotected Session Tokens
  - Session ID kept in Persistent Cookie
  - Not using http-only value for cookies
- Sessions valid for too long
  - Session not invalidated after logout
  - Session timeout too long
- Session fixation possible
  - Session ID not replaced after login (hence can be fixed)



## 8. Insecure Cryptographic Storage

- What is it?
  - Weak or no cryptographic protection on sensitive resources at rest
  - Lack of safeguards on keys
- What are the implications?
  - Session tokens can be predicted (due to weak, often homegrown, algorithms)
  - Sensitive data available through DB access (internal hacker, SQL Injection, etc.)



## Insecure Cryptographic Storage: Weak Session Token

- Hacker samples session IDs and gets:  
1,2,4,6,7,10,11,15...
- Can you predict other valid sessions?  
(Hint: Other users may enter site and get sessions during the hacker's sampling)
- Points to consider:
  - Doesn't need to be that simple...
  - Keys may be predictable (e.g. timestamp)



## 9. Insecure Communication

- What is it?
  - Sensitive data sent over unencrypted channels
- What are the implications?
  - Data can be stolen or manipulated by Internal or External hacker



## Insecure Communication: Points to Consider

- Not only the login page is sensitive
  - Anything after it is too, and maybe more
- Internal Hackers are a threat
  - Encrypt internal communications as well
- Use strong encryption keys
  - See previous topic...



## 10. Failure to Restrict URL Access

- What is it?
  - Resources that should only be available to authorized users can be accessed by forcefully browsing them
- What are the implications?
  - Sensitive information leaked/modified
  - Admin privileges made available to hacker



## Failure to Restrict URL Access - Admin User login

ONLINE BANKING LOGIN PERSONAL SMALL BUSINESS

PERSONAL

- Deposit Product
- Checking
- Loan Products
- Cards
- Investments & Insurance
- Other Services

SMALL BUSINESS

### Online Banking Login

Username:

Password:

Login

MY ACCOUNT PERSONAL SMALL BUSINESS

I WANT TO ...

- View Account Summary
- View Recent Transactions
- Transfer Funds
- Search News Articles
- Customize Site Language

ADMINISTRATION

- View Application Values
- Edit Users

/admin/admin.aspx

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## Simple user logs in, forcefully browses to admin page

ONLINE BANKING LOGIN PERSONAL SMALL BUSINESS

PERSONAL

- Deposit Product
- Checking
- Loan Products
- Cards
- Investments & Insurance
- Other Services

SMALL BUSINESS

### Online Banking Login

Username:

Password:

Login

MY ACCOUNT PERSONAL SMALL BUSINESS

I WANT TO ...

- View Account Summary
- View Recent Transactions
- Transfer Funds
- Search News Articles
- Customize Site Language

ADMINISTRATION

- View Application Values
- Edit Users

/admin/admin.aspx

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## Failure to Restrict URL Access: Privilege Escalation Types

- Access given to completely restricted resources
  - Accessing files that shouldn't be served (\*.bak, "Copy Of", \*.inc, \*.cs, ws\_ftp.log, etc.)
- Vertical Privilege Escalation
  - Unknown user accessing pages past login page
  - Simple user accessing admin pages
- Horizontal Privilege Escalation
  - User accessing other user's pages
  - Example: Bank account user accessing another's



## The OWASP Top 10 Application Attacks

Application Threat	Negative Impact	Example Impact
Cross Site scripting	Identity Theft, Sensitive Information Leakage, ...	Hackers can impersonate legitimate users, and control their accounts.
Injection Flaws	Attacker can manipulate queries to the DB / LDAP / Other system	Hackers can access backend database information, alter it or steal it.
Malicious File Execution	Execute shell commands on server, up to full control	Site modified to transfer all interactions to the hacker.
Insecure Direct Object Reference	Attacker can access sensitive files and resources	Web application returns contents of sensitive file (instead of harmless one)
Cross-Site Request Forgery	Attacker can invoke "blind" actions on web applications, impersonating as a trusted user	Blind requests to bank account transfer money to hacker
Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling	Attackers can gain detailed system information	Malicious system reconnaissance may assist in developing further attacks
Broken Authentication & Session Management	Session tokens not guarded or invalidated properly	Hacker can "force" session token on victim; session tokens can be stolen after logout
Insecure Cryptographic Storage	Weak encryption techniques may lead to broken encryption	Confidential information (SSN, Credit Cards) can be decrypted by malicious users
Insecure Communications	Sensitive info sent unencrypted over insecure channel	Unencrypted credentials "sniffed" and used by hacker to impersonate user
Failure to Restrict URL Access	Hacker can access unauthorized resources	Hacker can forcefully browse and access a page past the login page



## Module 3: Workshop Exercises




## Objective

Hacking 101:

- Understand reconnaissance and profiling
- 1. Hands-on: Find vulnerabilities and exploit
  - a) Failure to restrict URL access and information leakage
  - b) Cross site scripting (XSS)
  - c) SQL Injection
  - d) Advanced SQL Injection
- 2. Understand the difference between a vulnerability and an exploit



# Profiling a web application



## Reconnaissance and Profiling

- Platform
  - Technologies
  - Application servers
  - Web servers
  - Web server authentication
  - Database usage
  - Database type
  - Third-party components
- Application
  - Authentication
  - Authorization
  - Web based administration
  - User contributed content
  - Client side validation
  - Password creation
  - Session state
  - Error handling
  - Application logic



## How much did you find?

- Platform
  - .NET, JavaScript
  - IIS 5.0+
  - Anonymous web server authentication
  - Database in use
  - MS SQL? Access?
  - User management connections?
- Application
  - Form based authentication
  - User based authorization
  - Yes = /Admin
  - No social contribution areas
  - No password reset
  - Cookies (several)
  - Custom error pages
  - CGI execution

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

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## Task 1: Access the Administration section

- Step 1: Forceful browse to administration section
  - Does it exist?
  - The URL for the banking application is: <http://demo.testfire.net/bank>
    - What might the administrative application be?
  - Is there a default page?
  - What might you name a login page?
    - What was it for the banking application?
      - <http://demo.testfire.net/bank/login.aspx>
- Step 2: Ask some questions about the login page?
  - Is there a username associated with the password?
  - Is the password static?
  - What might I use for a password?
  - Where might I look for a password?
- Step 3: Exploit

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```

70
71 </td>
72 <td valign="top" colspan="3" class="bb">
73
74
75 <h1>Administration Login</h1>
76
77 <!-- Password: Altoro1234 -->
78
79 <form name="aspnetForm" method="post" action="login.aspx" id="aspnetForm">
80 <input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATE" id="__VIEWSTATE" value="/wEPDwUOKMTY5ODYzNjk3NWRRk" />
81
82 <br />
83 <p>
84 <strong>Enter the code shown above:</strong><br />
85 <input name="__ct10:ct10:Content:Main:CodeNumberTextBox" type="text" id="__ct10:ct10:Content:Main:CodeNumberTextBox" />
86 <strong>Enter the administrative password:</strong><br />
87 <input name="__ct10:ct10:Content:Main:Password" type="password" id="__ct10:ct10:Content:Main:Password" /><br /><br />
88 <input type="submit" name="__ct10:ct10:Content:Main:SubmitButton" value="Submit" id="__ct10:ct10:Content:Main:SubmitButton" />
89 </p>
90 <p><span id="__ct10:ct10:Content:Main:MessageLabel"></span></p>
91
92 <input type="hidden" name="__EVENTVALIDATION" id="__EVENTVALIDATION" value="/wEwBAKm/PqICgKaQvKtBQKWuPeSCgLT73pWUBA==" /></
93
94 <script>
95 window.onload = document.forms[1].elements[1].focus();
96 </script>
97
98
99 </td>
100 </tr>
101 </table>
102
103
104 </div>
105
106 <div id="footer" style="width: 99%;">

```

!!Action  
View page source  
  
!! We learn ...  
The PASSWORD

## Solution – Forceful browsing

- Navigate to <http://demo.testfire.net>
- Try <http://demo.testfire.net/administration>
  - Fails
- Try <http://demo.testfire.net/admin>
  - Success
  - No default page
- Try <http://demo.testfire.net/admin/logon.aspx>
  - Failure
- Try <http://demo.testfire.net/admin/login.aspx>



## Solution – Information Leakage


- The administration section uses a single password
- Try to guess the password
  - Password, password, password1, Password1
  - Admin, admin, Admin1, admin1
  - Altoro, Altoro, Altoro1, altoro1
- View the page source
- Search for comments
  - Success



## Task 2: Steal the user cookie

- Step 1: Determine the best attack method
  - How do I force the client to run my commands?
  - What scripting language are almost all browsers able to execute?
- Step 2: Find the application vulnerability
  - Where might I be able to include content within an application?
  - What does the payload look like?
  - How do I access the client cookie?
- Step 3: Exploit
  - Discussion Topic
    - How do I send this cookie from the victim to the attacker?











## Task 3: Login without credentials

- Step 1: Find the login page
  - Can you create an account?
  - Can you determine a valid username?
- Step 2: Can you cause an error?
  - What information do you learn when you cause an error?
  - What database is this using?
  - What are techniques that you might use?
  - What characters terminate a SQL statement?
- Step 3: Exploit









## Solution – Profile the login page

- Navigate to <http://demo.testfire.net/bank/login.aspx>
- Enter sample username without password
  - Usage of client-side JavaScript
- Enter sample username with password
  - No credential enumeration
- Enter sample username with single tick (') as password
  - SQL injection vulnerability
  - Verbose error messages
  - Column names of username and password



## Solution – SQL Injection

- Enter sample username with password of '--
  - Double hyphen terminates a SQL statement
- Enter probable username (admin) with special characters appended '--
  - Successful exploitation of SQL injection



## Task 4: Steal all the usernames and passwords

- Step 1: Find a page that lists information
  - What page lists information?
  - Does the page accept user input in any way?
  - Think about how this information is pulled from the database?
- Step 2: Find the vulnerability
  - How do I manipulate the input to find a vulnerability?
  - What steps should I try to “break the system”
- Step 3: Exploit
  - What steps are required to make this happen?

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Altoro Mutual: Online Banking Home - Windows Internet Explorer

http://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.aspx

Sign Off | Contact Us | Feedback | Search

**AltoroMutual**

MY ACCOUNT | PERSONAL | SMALL BUSINESS | INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL

**I WANT TO ...**

- View Account Summary
- View Recent Transactions
- Transfer Funds
- Search News Articles
- Customize Site Language

**ADMINISTRATION**

- View Application Values
- Edit Users

**Hello, Admin User**

Welcome to Altoro Mutual Online.

View Account Details:

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**!!Action**  
Start in current session

**!! We learn ...**  
The admin has no bank accounts

Altoro Mutual: Recent Transactions - Windows Internet Explorer

http://demo.testfire.net/bank/transaction.aspx

Altoro Mutual: Recent Transactions

Sign Off | Contact Us | Feedback | Search

AltoroMutual

DEMO SITE ONLY

MY ACCOUNT PERSONAL SMALL BUSINESS INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL

I WANT TO ...

- View Account Summary
- View Recent Transactions
- Transfer Funds
- Search News Articles
- Customize Site Language

ADMINISTRATION

- View Application Values
- Edit Users

### Recent Transactions

After 12/12/2010 Before Submit

TransactionID	AccountID	Description	Amount
1			

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!!Action

Enter some date in the future

!! We learn ...

No user activity

Altoro Mutual: Server Error - Windows Internet Explorer

http://demo.testfire.net/bank/transaction.aspx

Altoro Mutual: Server Error

Sign Off | Contact Us | Feedback | Search

AltoroMutual

DEMO SITE ONLY

### An Error Has Occurred

Summary:

Syntax error in string in query expression '1=1 and t.trans\_date >= ' and a.userid = 100416016'.

Error Message:

System.Data.OleDb.OleDbException: Syntax error in string in query expression '1=1 and t.trans\_date >= ' and a.userid = 100416016'. at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteNonQueryForSingleResult(tagDBPARAMS dbParams, Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteNonQuery(Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteNonQuery(CommandBehavior behavior, Object& executeResult) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteReaderInternal(CommandBehavior behavior, String method) at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteReader(CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.FillInternal(DataSet dataset, DataTable[] datatables, Int32 startRecord, Int32 maxRecords, String srcTable, IDbCommand command, CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.Fill(DataSet dataSet, Int32 startRecord, Int32 maxRecords, String srcTable, IDbCommand command, CommandBehavior behavior) at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.Fill(DataSet dataSet, String srcTable) at Altoro.Transaction.Page\_Load(Object sender, EventArgs e) at System.Web.Util.CalliEventHandlerDelegateProxy.Callback(Object sender, EventArgs e) at System.Web.UI.Control.LoadRecursive() at System.Web.UI.Page.ProcessRequestMain(Boolean includeStagesAfterAsyncPoint)

!!Action

Single tick in form field

!! We learn ...

Vulnerable to SQL injection

Column named userid

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AltoroMutual: Recent Transactions - Windows Internet Explorer

http://www.althoromutual.com/bank/transaction.aspx

Sign Off | Contact Us | Feedback | Search

AltoroMutual

MY ACCOUNT | PERSONAL | SMALL BUSINESS | INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL

I WANT TO ...

- View Account Summary
- View Recent Transactions
- Transfer Funds
- Search News Articles
- Customize Site Language

Recent Transactions

After: 1/1/2010 union select Before: Submit

TransactionID	AccountID	Description	Amount
1		username: admin password:admin	
2		username: tuser password:tuser	
100116013		username: sjoe password:frazier	
100116014		username: jsmith password:Demo1234	
100116015		username: cclay password:Ali	
100116018		username: asped password:Demo1234	

!!Action  
Enter valid SQL command. We already know 3 columns (userid, username, password) and a table in the database!!!  
1/1/2010 union select userid,null,'username: '+username+ ' password: '+password,null from users—  
!! We learn ...  
All the usernames and passwords

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## Solution – Find the vulnerability

- Use technique from the last task to login
- Find a page that lists information from the DB
  - <http://demo.testfire.net/bank/transactions.aspx>
- Enter a single tick (') in the first form field
  - Vulnerable to SQL injection
  - Verbose error messages
  - Column named userid (we already know about username and password)

## Solution – Complex SQL Injection

- Query: `1/1/2010 union select 1 from users--`
  - Error message about matching columns
  - Learn that table users exists
- Query: `1/1/2010 union select 1,1,1,1 from users--`
  - Successful in executing query
- We already know 3 columns (userid, username, password) and a table in the database
- Query: `1/1/2010 union select userid,null,username+'  
' +password,null from users--`
  - Successful exploitation



## Questions

1. Understand reconnaissance and profiling
2. Hands-on: Find vulnerabilities and exploit
  - a) Forceful browsing and information leakage
  - b) Cross site scripting (XSS)
  - c) SQL Injection
  - d) Advanced SQL Injection
3. Understand the difference between a vulnerability and an exploit



## Module 4: Automated Techniques



### Objective


1. Understand how automation can help uncover vulnerabilities
2. Demonstration of automated vulnerability assessment
3. Understand the limitations of vulnerability assessment





# Welcome to AppScan

- Double click on IBM Rational's AppScan
- Choose Open




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# Pick a Template

- Choose Default under Predefined Templates



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## Type of Scan

- Select the type of scan you wish to perform
- Select Web Application Scan
- Click Next




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## What to scan

- Select the scanned application
- Type <http://demo.testfire.net>
- Click Next >




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# Login

- Choose Automatic login
- User name: jsmith Password: Demo1234
- Click Next

Note: you may want to choose the record option and follow the steps



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
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# What to test

Select the test policy

- Click on 'Load'
- Select 'Application-Only'
- Click OK
- Click Next

For this exercise we will test just for application level vulnerabilities



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# Start the scan

- Select 'Start a full automatic scan'


AppScan will perform  
Explore and execute  
Tests



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# View the results



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
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## Module 5: An Enterprise Vision



Solution

## Asking the Wrong Question





Solution

## Understanding the Root Causes

- 1 Takes the focus off the symptoms
- 2 Eliminates over-reporting
- 3 Highlights pro-active security
- 4 Can help build education programs
- 5 CHASING VULNERABILITIES DOESN'T WORK

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Solution

## Online Risk Management for the Enterprise

**People**

**Process**

**Technology**


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Solution

## The People Factor




- Repeatable, measurable education system
  - Eight principles of security
  - Six primary threat classifications
- Resource library
  - Corporate policy
  - Best practices
  - Specific process with security artifacts
- Feedback Loop
  - Development, QA and Internal
  - Support and External



Solution

## The Process Factor




- Defined secure lifecycle
  - Risk Profiling
  - Architectural Risk Analysis / Threat Modeling
  - Defined inputs and outputs
  - Checkpoints and Gates
- Feedback loop for process improvement
  - Internal
  - External
- MEASUREMENT





Solution

# The Technology Factor




- Automated analysis
  - Strengths
    - Technical vulnerabilities
    - Scale and cost
  - Weaknesses
    - Architectural and logical design flaws
- Manual analysis
  - Strengths
    - The “human factor”
    - Design flaws
  - Weaknesses
    - Costly (time and money)





Solution

# Security Considerations in the SDLC










Solution

People  
Process  
Technology

## Application Security - When?

1

Black Box



2

White Box

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
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Solution

People  
Process  
Technology



## Financial Impact



Source: Implementing Software Inspections, IBM Systems Sciences Institute, IBM

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## Q & A

Questions?



## Additional Resources

- OWASP
  - [www.owasp.org](http://www.owasp.org)
  - Top Ten List
  - Secure Development
- Web Application Security Consortium
  - [www.webappsec.org](http://www.webappsec.org)
  - Threat Classification
  - Web Hacking Incidents Database



## Additional Resources

- Download free trial of IBM Rational AppScan 7.8:  
<http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/downloads/r/appscan/>
- Library: Whitepapers, analyst reports, brochures, etc:  
<http://www-306.ibm.com/software/rational/sw-library/>
- IBM Rational upcoming events:  
[http://www-306.ibm.com/software/rational/events\\_1.html](http://www-306.ibm.com/software/rational/events_1.html)



Thanks for joining me today!

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